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Rethinking Anonymity for Social Networks
Aaron Beach, Mike Gartrell, Richard Han
University of Colorado at Boulder
{aaron.beach, mike.gartrell, richard.han}@colorado.edu
Abstract—This paper explains why existing anonymity models
such as k-anonymity cannot be applied to the most common form
of private data release on the internet, social network APIs.
An alternative anonymity model, PP-anonymity, is presented,
which measures the posterior probability of an attacker logically
deducing previously unknown private information using a social
network API. Finally, the feasibility of such an approach is evalu-
ated suggesting that a social network site such as Facebook could
practically implement an anonymous API using PP-anonymity,
providing its users with an anonymous option to the current
application model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional anonymity research assumes that data is released
as a research-style microdata set or statistical data set with well
understood data types. Furthermore, it is assumed that the data
provider knows a priori the background knowledge of possible
attackers and how the data will be used. These models use
these assumptions to specify data types as “quasi-identifiable”
or “sensitive”. However, it is not so simple to make these
assumptions about social networks. It is not easy to predict
how applications may use social network data nor can concrete
assumptions be made about the background knowledge of
those who may attack a social network user’s privacy. As such,
all social network data must be treated as both sensitive and
quasi-identifiable which breaks the existing anonymity models.
This paper discusses how the interactive data release model,
used by social network APIs, may be utilized to provide
anonymity guarantees without bounding attacker background
knowledge or knowing how the data might be used. It is
demonstrated that this data release model and anonymity
definition provide applications with greater utility and stronger
anonymity guarantees than would be provided by anonymizing
the same data set using traditional methods and releasing it
publicly.
This new anonymity model measures the maximum poste-
rior probability that some user is associated with their private
data conditioned on the data released by a social network API
query. We call this anonymity model PP-anonymity (Posterior-
Probability), and evaluate the feasibility of providing such a
guarantee with a social network API.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy within the context of social networks is becoming
a very hot topic in both research and among the public. This
is largely due to an increase in use of Facebook and a set of
high-profile incidents such as the de-anonymization of public
data sets [3]. However, public concern about privacy has not
necessarily translated into more responsible usage of the exist-
ing privacy mechanisms. It is suggested that this may be due
to the complexity of translating real-world privacy concerns
into online privacy policies, as such it has been suggested
that machine learning techniques could automatically generate
privacy policies for users [4]. Research into anonymizing data
sets (or microdata releases) to protect privacy directly apply to
the work in this paper. Most of this research has taken place
within the database research community. In 2001, Sweeney
published a paper [8] describing the “re-identification” attack
in which multiple public data sources may be combined to
compromise the privacy of an individual. The paper proposes
an anonymity definition called k-anonymity. This definition
was further developed and new approaches to anonymity were
proposed that solved problems with the previous approaches.
These later anonymity definitions include p-sensitivity [9], !-
diversity [10], t-closeness [11], differential privacy [12], and
multi-dimensional k-anonymity [13]. All of these privacy ap-
proaches and their associated terms are discussed in section III.
Methods have been developed that attempt to efficiently
achieve anonymization of data sets under certain anonymity
definitions. Initially simple methods such as suppression (re-
moving data) and generalization have been used to anonymize
data sets. Research has sought to optimize these methods
using techniques such as minimizing information loss while
maximizing anonymity [14]. One approach called “Incognito”
considers all possible generalizations of data throughout the
entire database and chooses the optimal generalization [15].
Another approach called “Injector” uses data mining to model
background knowledge of a possible attacker [16] and then
optimizes the anonymization based on this background knowl-
edge.
It has been shown that checking “perfect privacy” (zero
information disclosure), which applies to measuring differ-
ential privacy and arguably should apply to most anonymity
definitions, is Πp2-Complete [17]. However, other work has
shown that optimal k-anonymity can be approximated in
reasonable time for large datasets to within O(k log k)
when k is constant, though runtime for such algorithms is
exponential in k. It has been shown that Facebook data can
be modeled as a Boolean expression which when simplified
measures its k-anonymity [18]. Section VIII discusses how
such expressions, constructed from Facebook data, are of a
type that can be simplified in linear time by certain logic
minimization algorithms[19].
Privacy in social networks becomes more complicated when
the social applications integrate with mobile, sensing, wear-
able, and generally context-aware information. Many new
mobile social networking applications in industry and research
require the sharing of location or “presence”. For example,
projects such as Serendipity [1] integrate social network infor-
mation with location-aware mobile applications. New mobile
social applications such as Foursquare, Gowalla, etc. . . also
integrate mobile and social information. Research suggests
that this trend will continue toward seamlessly integrating
personal information from diverse Internet sources, including
social networks, mobile and environmental sensors, location
and historical behavior [2]. In such mobile social networks,
researchers have begun to explore how location or presence
information may be exchanged without compromising an
application user’s privacy [5], [6]. Furthermore, other mobile
information such as sensors may be used to drive mobile
applications and this brings up issues of data verification and
trust that are discussed here [7]. Thus, the ideas introduced in
this paper will likely expand in applicability as social networks
are extended into the mobile space.
III. DEFINING ANONYMITY
This section discusses the basic terms used in this paper.
It breaks them up into data types, anonymity definitions, and
anonymization techniques.
A. Data Types
The data sets most often considered in anonymization
research usually take the form of a table with at least three
columns that usually include zip code, age, (sometimes gen-
der), and a health condition. This data set is convenient for
many reasons, including its simplicity, but also contains (and
doesn’t contain) representative data types that are important to
anonymization. First, it does not contain any unique identifiers
such as Social Security numbers. The first step in anonymizing
a data set is removing the unique identifiers. The most common
unique identifiers discussed in this paper are social network
user IDs (Facebook ID or username). The data set also contains
a set of quasi-identifiers - age, zip code, and gender are the
most common. Data may be considered a quasi-identifier if
it can be matched with other data (external to the data set)
which maps to some unique identifier. The re-identification
attack consists of matching a set of quasi-identifiers from
an anonymized data set to a public data set (such as census
or voting records) effectively de-anonymizing the anonymous
data set. It is important to note that quasi-identifiers are
assumed to be public (or possibly public) by definition and
as such are not the primary data to be protected. The data
that are to be protected from re-identification are termed
sensitive attributes. Sensitive attributes are not assumed to
be publicly associated with a unique identifier and as such
their relationship to the quasi-identifiers within a data set is
what concerns most anonymity definitions. In most research
examples health conditions or disease attributes are considered
sensitive attributes. A set of sensitive attributes that share the
same set of quasi-identifiers are, together with their quasi-
identifier set, called an equivalence class. For example, the
health conditions associated with 25 year old males living in
a particular zip code would be an equivalence class.
Furthermore, the {zip code, gender, age, disease} data
set is useful because its data exhibit different characteris-
tics. Zip codes are structured hierarchically and ages are
naturally ordered. The rightmost digits in zip codes can be
removed for generalization and ages can be grouped into
ranges. Gender presents a binary attribute which cannot be
generalized because doing so would render it meaningless.
Finally, using disease as the sensitive value is convenient since
health records are generally considered to be private. Also,
disease is usually represented as a text string which presents
semantic challenges to anonymization such as understanding
the relationship between different diseases.
B. Anonymity Definitions
K-Anonymity [8] states that a data set is k-anonymous
if every equivalence class is of size k (includes at least
k records). However, it was observed that if the sensitive
attribute was the same for all records in an equivalence
class then the size of the equivalence class did not provide
anonymity since mapping a unique identifier to the equivalence
class was sufficient to also map it to the sensitive attribute; this
is called attribute disclosure.
p-sensitivity [9] was suggested to defend against attribute
disclosure while complementing k-anonymity. It states that
along with k-anonymity there must also be at least p different
values for each sensitive attribute within a given equivalence
class. In this case, an attacker that mapped a unique identifier
to an equivalence class would have at least p different values
from which only one correctly applied to the unique identifier.
One weakness of p-sensitivity is that the size and diversity of
the anonymized data set is limited to the diversity of values
in the sensitive attribute. If the values of the sensitive attribute
are not uniformly distributed across the equivalence classes
there will be significant data loss even for small p values.
!-diversity [10] was suggested to prevent attribute disclosure
through either requiring a minimum of “entropy” in the
values of the sensitive attribute or by placing a minimum
and maximum on how often a particular value may occur
within an equivalence class. While preventing direct attribute
disclosure such an anonymization may result in the distribution
of sensitive attribute values being significantly skewed. If the
distribution of a sensitive attribute is known, this knowledge
could be used to calculate the probability of a particular sen-
sitive attribute value being associated with a unique identifier.
For instance, while only 5/1000 records in a data set contain
a particular disease, there may exist an equivalence class in
the anonymized data set for which half the records contain the
disease, implying that members of the equivalence class are
20 times more likely to have the disease.
t-closeness [11] approaches the problem of skewness by
bounding the distance between the distribution of sensitive
attribute values in the entire data set and their distribution
within each equivalence class. The problem (or trade-off)
with t-closeness is that it achieves anonymity by limiting the
statistical difference between equivalence classes and in doing
so minimizes any interesting correlations or statistics that
could be drawn from the anonymized data set. Furthermore, it
is not clear that there is any efficient way to enforce t-closeness
on a large data set [20].
Defending against skewness attacks presents a paradox -
data sets are useful because they contain correlations that say
something about the world outside of the data set, which is
what a skewness attack does. In this sense the utility of a
data set and its danger to privacy are correlated. Skewness
attacks should therefore be approached practically considering
the nature of the sensitive attributes in terms of the danger
of their compromise and the utility they provide by being
released.
Multi-Dimensional K-Anonymity [13] proposes a more
flexible approach to K-anonymity in which equivalence
classes are clustered or generalized across a table in more
than one dimension. This flexibility allows for a higher degree
of optimization than simply generalizing each column of a
database separately. While optimizing the selection of equiv-
alence classes is NP-hard, a greedy approximation algorithm
for multi-dimensionalK-anonymity has been shown to outper-
form exhaustive optimal algorithms for a single dimension.
Differential Privacy [12] takes a different perspective on
privacy than the other privacy models discussed in this paper.
Most interestingly, it assumes an interactive database model in
which, as opposed to a non-interactive microdata release, the
data collector provides an interface through which users may
query and receive answers. As will be discussed in section IV,
this model fits that currently used by many social network
APIs and is much more practical for the types of data use
associated with social networks. However, differential privacy
focuses primarily on statistical databases, the queries on which
are answered with added noise which guarantees a maximum
level of danger to the privacy of anyone participating in the
database. The difficulty in applying this to social networks is
in appropriately measuring or defining “noise” in a way that
meaningfully integrates with the data’s use by social network
applications. While interesting, this paper does not deal with
the same problem. However, the interactive database model
assumed by differential privacy is promoted as the appropriate
model for anonymity mechanisms applied to social networks.
C. Anonymization Techniques
Finally, anonymization commonly consists of generalizing,
perturbing, or suppressing data. Generalization of data requires
some ordering or structure to the data type such that many
specific values of data can be grouped as a related, but more
general value. Perturbation involves distorting or adding noise
to a value. Some types of data such as images may be
perturbed and still useful. However, much social network data
may not be useful when modified or generalized and as such
must be removed or suppressed - as such suppression is the
most generally applicable approach to anonymization when
one cannot make assumptions about how generalization or
perturbation will affect the utility of the data. Also, it should be
noted that in social networks it is very common for a data field
to have many values separated by commas. When items are
suppressed from such data fields it could be said that the value
of the data field has been generalized - however, this paper will
refer to such an anonymization technique as suppression.
IV. SOCIAL NETWORK DATA
This section will highlight the difficulties of applying exist-
ing anonymity definitions and models to social network data.
Most anonymity research assumes the same convenient data
set discussed in section III. This data set contains a few quasi-
identifiers that are usually hierarchical or ordered such that
they can be easily generalized along with a clearly identifiable
sensitive attribute. Furthermore, anonymity research has gen-
erally assumed a rather research-centric non-interactive data
release model.
A. Data Characterization
The traditional anonymity data set consists of some version
of {zip code, gender, age, disease}. This data set is easy to
understand and naturally translates to privacy examples since it
uses traditionally accepted quasi-identifiers and sensitive data.
Social networks do not provide such convenient data.
Social network data often consists of attributes
such as name, unique ID, friendship links, favorite
movies/music/activities, birthdate, gender, hometown,
group associations, guestbook or wall posts, pictures, videos,
messages, status updates, and sometimes current location. To
simplify discussion of social network data in this section we
will assume the usage model and data types of the largest
social network, Facebook.
The first task in anonymizing social network data is to
specify which attributes are unique identifiers, quasi-identifiers
and sensitive attributes. Obviously, the unique ID is a unique
identifier and some people may wish that their name be consid-
ered a unique identifier as well. There are then the traditional
quasi-identifiers including city, birthdate, and gender - however
these data types are often targeted by Facebook applications
as the attributes of interest (such as birthday calendar appli-
cations), and may be considered sensitive attributes by some
users. In fact, depending on a user’s privacy settings nearly
every data attribute may be publicly available or semi-public
within a region or network. Furthermore, these privacy settings
are constantly changing and the user’s privacy expectations
may change drastically depending on context. Given the lack
of clear assumptions as to the public availability of most
information on Facebook, all data types should be considered
a quasi-identifier. Also, given the complex nature of social
network applications, (e.g., calendars of friends’ birthdays,
context-aware music players, or location-aware games) all
attributes may potentially be considered sensitive attributes
within certain contexts and as such all data types should be
considered sensitive attributes.
This poses significant problems to utilizing traditional
anonymity solutions for social networks. If a single attribute
is considered both quasi-identifiable and sensitive it renders
                    DATA SET                                                         QUERY                          RESPONSE  
ID
A
B
C
D
E
COLLEGE
Harvard
MIT
Northwestern
Northwestern
Northwestern
BIRTH
8/5/83
9/21/81
5/4/72
8/29/85
2/12/64
MOVIES
Avatar, Titanic
Titanic, Terminator
Terminator, Avatar, 
Spiderman
Avatar, Batman, 
Titanic
Batman, Spiderman
LOCATION
39.78 , 107.10
39.46 , 104.55
38.98 , 102.11
40.05 , 109.17
51.32 , 00.51
Avatar, Batman, 
Spiderman
q = 1.5
Query 2:
SELECT movies WHERE 
college=Northwestern
Query 1:
SELECT movies
WHERE birth < 1/1/80
Query 3:
SELECT movies WHERE 
DISTANCE(39.00,105.00) 
<= 25.0 MILES
Avatar, Terminator, 
Batman, Spiderman
q = 1.0
Avatar, Titanic
q = 3.0
Fig. 1. Example data set, queries, and responses with associated q values for different PP-anonymity
k-anonymity incompatible with !-diversity, p-sensitivity, and
t-closeness. This is because equivalence classes must share
the same quasi-identifier set (have the same values for all
quasi-identifier attributes) and !-diversity, p-sensitivity, and t-
closeness require some variation of all sensitive attributes. t-
closeness, !-diversity, and p-sensitivity all assume equivalence
classes defined by a shared quasi-identifier set. If some at-
tribute was both sensitive and quasi-identifiable then it would
be required to have the same value throughout the equivalence
class (to avoid re-identification) and it would be required to
have different values (to avoid attribute disclosure) rendering
!-diversity, p-sensitivity, and t-closeness 1 meaningless.
B. Data Usage
The obstacles to applying traditional anonymity approaches
to social networks arise largely from the assumption that
data is released in a non-interactive form as a database or
table. Such a table results in each set of quasi-identifiers
being uniquely associated with its sensitive attributes. How-
ever, this type of data association may not be necessary for
many applications. Furthermore, a particular application may
only be interested in a particular set of equivalence classes
which include only a subset of quasi-identifiers. However, an
alternative to the non-interactive data release model exists. In
an interactive model, a “trusted” data collector provides an
interface through which users or applications may query for
information through an API or general language like SQL.
Fortunately, Facebook already offers both a function API
and a SQL-like language called FQL. Facebook’s interface
is currently used by over 500,000 applications and most
major websites on the internet. Recent developments, such
as the announcement that Facebook will soon integrate users’
location information and automatically release this information
to “trusted” third-parties without the user’s explicit approval,
provide a clear motivation for solutions to anonymity within
an interactive data release model.
The next section defines the re-identification or anonymity
problem assuming an interactive model and assuming that all
data attributes are both quasi-identifiable and sensitive.
1being quasi-identifiable, the attribute must have a uniform distribution of
one value
V. THE ANONYMITY PROBLEM IN SOCIAL NETWORKS
This section proposes a new anonymity problem in social
networks that more closely conforms with the data types
characteristic of social networks as well as the interactive
data release model supported by social networks. In this
new anonymity problem, a trusted data collector wishes to
provide an interface through which applications may query
user data without compromising the user’s privacy beyond
some threshold. Generally, a query is considered admissible if
its released information does not result in any previously un-
known mapping between data and identity having an implied
posterior possibility greater than some threshold. We will refer
to anonymous interactive interfaces that provide guarantees
on such posterior probability as being “PP-anonymous”. This
section will also define how the interactive interface functions
and the assumed background knowledge of the adversary.
PP-Anonymous Definition: We use the definition of “pos-
terior probability” as the probability that an uncertain propo-
sition is conditionally known by some adversary after the
relevant evidence from an event is taken into account. In this
case, the event is a re-identification attack in which some
previously unknown mapping between a piece of private data
and an identity is known to exist with some posterior proba-
bility conditional to the data released by a query. Therefore,
given some value q - a query is PP-anonymous if the posterior
probability of the existence of a previously unknown mapping
between identity and data is greater than 1q .
Adversary Definition: Furthermore, we assume that the
adversary may have access to any entry in the data set.
Therefore, in spite of its general impossibility for statistical
databases [12] we will accept the intention of Dalenius’
desideratum for statistical databases: “that nothing about an
individual should be learnable from the database that cannot
be learned without access to the database.” We define learned
in terms of posterior probability of existence.
Interactive Interface Definition: For the purposes of this
paper, we define an interactive interface, using traditional
anonymity terms, as an interface that allows applications to
specify an equivalence class through a query along with
attributes of interest. The interface returns the values of the
attributes as one field or array not specifying any mapping
between table entries and attribute values. The interface may
return zero or more values from each entry in the equivalence
                    DATA SET                                                         QUERY                          RESPONSE  
-
k=2
Query 2:
SELECT movies WHERE 
college=Northwestern
Query 1:
SELECT movies
WHERE birth < 1/1/80
Query 3:
SELECT movies WHERE 
DISTANCE(39.00,105.00) 
<= 25.0 MILES
-
k=2
Titanic
k=2
ID
A
B
C
D
E
COLLEGE
-
-
Northwestern
Northwestern
Northwestern
BIRTH
1981-83
1981-83
1972-85
1972-85
1972-85
MOVIES
Titanic
Titanic
-
-
-
LOCATION
near Denver
near Denver
US or Europe
US or Europe
US or Europe
Fig. 2. Example data set K-anonymized with k = 2
class.
Privacy Compromise Definition: A privacy compromise
has occurred if PP-anonymity, with a given q value, is violated
by a response to some query.
It should be noted that if a query specifies an equivalence
class that has fewer than q entries, the adversary may know
that at least some of the released data is mapped to fewer than
q identities, hence PP-anonymity implicitly requires all equiv-
alence classes specified by a query to be at least size q. This
requirement relates to the original K-anonymity definition.
Since the query response from the interactive interface
does not include mappings between table entries and attribute
values, the set of values may map to many different groups
of individuals, each of which may fully account for all values
in the query response. The next section discusses how the
existence of these different groups, all of which account for a
data release, may be measured to infer the probability that a
set of private data is mapped to a specific individual.
VI. MEASURING ANONYMITY
This section will discuss a practical approach to calculating
bounds on knowledge learned by an adversary that may
know every data value in a data set except one (the one
we are theoretically calculating the bound for). By “bounding
knowledge” we mean not releasing information that implies a
posterior probability of association between an an individual
and their private data greater than 1q . In calculating this bound
for a particular query response we say we are measuring the
privacy of the query response. Hence, the larger the q value
the greater the PP-anonymity.
This section will explain ways to measure q, starting from
the perspective of the adversary. A possible attack will be
described which will imply a way that q can be calculated. In
this way, the value of q will be concretely connected with its
privacy implications from the beginning. Each example will be
connected with the example data set, queries, and responses
presented in Figure 1.
Rare Value Attack: Many strings found in social network
data fields are very unique. For example, sometimes a user who
likes the movie Avatar may include the string “Avatar totally
rocks!!!” in their movie list, rather than simply including the
string “Avatar”. This string may uniquely map to the user and
obviously should never be released from a social network’s
anonymous interface. Assume the string does uniquely map
to this user and also say an attacker knows this and wants to
find the location of the user. The attacker also knows that the
anonymous interface only returns queries that are admissible
under PP-anonymity with q = 6. The attacker could create
5 fake users at a particular location and list “Avatar totally
rocks!!!” in their movie list. Then the attacker could query for
the movie lists of users within a geographic area including the
location of his five users. If the query is responded to with the
string “Avatar totally rocks!!!” the attacker would know that
the victim user was also in that geographic area, since there
must have been at least 6 users in that area with the unique
movie string or else the query would not have included it in
the response.
This presents a rather simple way to measure privacy. The
anonymous interface could simply measure the privacy of a
query response by taking the least common value from the
query response and counting the number of individuals in the
equivalence class2 that are associated with that value. We will
refer to this value as the Least Common Value count (LCV
count). As can be seen in Query 1 in Figure 1, the response
contains four movies, one of which (Batman) is only listed by
one individual in the specified equivalence class (those born
before 1980). Hence this response appropriately lists q = 1.
However, the next example will show that this measure of
privacy is only an upper bound on privacy knowledge and
misrepresents what the attacker may logically deduce from a
query response.
Logical Exclusion Attack: Consider the response to Query
2 in Figure 1. Each of the three movies in the response
has at least two individuals in whose movie lists they are
included and might be considered PP-anonymous with q = 2.
However this is not necesarilly the correct bound on posterior
probability of associating the set of movies with an individual
in the data set. The attacker could logically deduce that one of
three possibilities must exist, the group correctly accounting
for the data must contain either persons C and D, D and E, or C
and E. These three groups represent the minimal combinations
of which at least one must exist within any group which fully
accounts for the data released by the query. This could be
expressed as the boolean expression (CD+DE+CE). Given
that each individual is in two of the three groups the attacker
can assume that there is a 23 (or 66%) possibility that one of
2remember the equivalence class is specified by the query paramaters
those individuals is correctly associated with the data, hence
q = 1.5.
This presents a stronger measure of privacy but is more
complicated to measure. To measure privacy in this way
requires that one find the minimal set of groups required
to fully account for the data being released. Section VII
discusses how this can be done by representing the data
values and their mapping to users as a boolean expression
and finding the prime implicants using logic minimization.
Representing social network data in this manner was originally
suggested and discussed for use in a mobile social network
application [18].
For comparison, the example of the data set is also pre-
sented in Figure 2 anonymized with traditional k-anonymity
(k = 2). Note that optimal k-anonymization would depend on
knowing the application intentions and attributes of interest
beforehand. While this is not possible, the example data set
is k-anonymized to retain as much useful data as possible for
comparison. Furthermore, it should be noted that this data set
cannot contain diversity (as discussed in section IV) and as
such is trivially vulnerable to an attribute disclosure attack.
VII. REAL-TIME ANONYMIZATION
This section discusses the practical steps involved in mea-
suring the q value for PP-anonymity. The steps generally con-
sist of (1) Building a logical Sum-of-Products (SOP) expres-
sion from the data to be released by a query. (2) Minimizing
the SOP expression to find the essential prime implicants.
(3) Calculating q which is the number of occurrences of the
most common literal (variable) divided by the number of terms
(clauses) in the minimized expression. Each of these steps will
be explained and then the section will finish with a discussion
of how this approach would perform in the real-world.
Remember that a query specifies an equivalence class (e.g.,
“men under 25 in Denver”) and an attribute of interest within
that class (e.g., “Movies”). The query response consists of a set
of values from the attribute of interest within the equivalence
class. It is this set of values in the query response and
its relationship to the equivalence class that is measured to
calculate q.
A. Step 1: Building an SOP Expression
This section describes how a product-of-sums (POS) expres-
sion is created from an equivalence class specifying a set of
users and their data. The POS expression can then be converted
to a Sum-of-Products (SOP) expression by De Morgan’s law
or more efficient method.
Given an equivalence class E consisting of n user entries
and m attributes for which S is the set of all attribute values.
We define a set Ei ∈ E as the set of users which map to
a certain value Si ∈ S. A POS expression is formed from
Ei whereby every set Ei ∈ E is mapped into a sum term
(clause) in which every user e ∈ Ei is a literal (variable).
This POS expression is then converted to an SOP expression
for minimization or minimized directly, understanding that the
output must be a two-level SOP expression.
ID
A
C
D
MOVIES
Avatar, Titanic
Titanic, Terminator
Terminator, 
Avatar, Spiderman
Avatar, Batman, 
Titanic
Query 3:
SELECT movies WHERE 
DISTANCE(39.00,105.00) <= 
25.0 MILES
Simplified SOP Expression
AB + AC + BD + BC + CD
N=5    M=3
q = N/M = 1.67
B
Unsimplified POS Expression
(A+C+D) (A+B+D) (B+C)
Response
Avatar, Titanic, Terminator
Fig. 3. Example of using logic minimization to calculate q
B. Step 2: Minimizing the Expression
The SOP expression is then minimized using a logic mini-
mization method which finds the essential prime implicants of
the expression. A classic algorithm for doing this is the Quine-
McCluskey algorithm, developed in 1950’s. This algorithm
was used for initial evaluation of a related problem [18] and
those results are discussed in section ?? along with discussion
of how more recent developments in logic minimization may
allow this step to scale linearly with the number of individuals
and data items.
C. Step 3: Calculating q
Given a minimized SOP expression with n product terms
the maximum number of times that any literal occurs (m) is
divided by n. Hence q = nm . Because the SOP expression
is expressed partially with only the on-set - all product terms
contain at most one occurrence of any literal. Therefore n ≥ m
meaning that q ≥ 1 and since all literals must occur at least
once q ≤ n.
D. Example
To help explain the process of measuring PP-anonymity we
will reconsider Query 3 from Figure 1, however this time q
will be calculated for a different query response. This example
will be explained using Figure 3. The query requests the
“MOVIE” values for those individuals within a geographic
area specified in latitude and longitude. This area includes
individuals {A,B,C,D}. In this case, q is being calculated for
the response {Avatar, Titanic, Terminator}. As can be seen in
Figure 3: Avatar is mapped to {A,C,D}, Titanic to {A,B,D}
and Terminator to {B,C}. This results in 9 possible groups
which could possibly account for the entire response set,
these groups are represented by the unsimplified expression
in Figure 3. Minimizing the unsimplified expression results in
an expression with 5 product terms. Since there are 5 product
terms in the unsimplified expression and no literal occurs more
than 3 times n = 5 and m = 3, hence nm = q = 1.667.
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VIII. EVALUATION
This section evaluates a set of Facebook data including
over 700 users’ city location, network affiliation, music, and
movie preferences. The users in data set are all friends with
the same user and could be considered an equivalence class
specified by this friendship. As such, the data samples are
not random but may be considered realistic for socio-digital
systems in which social connections are natural aggregators.
The distributions of these data are presented to understand the
practical size of some equivalence classes and the distribution
of their attribute data. These values are discussed in terms of q
and what values of q are actually practical for a social network
such as Facebook. Finally, a basic prototype is presented to
show the feasibility of measuring q for social network data
applications with discussion of how advanced logic minimiza-
tion algorithms might scale in relation to social networks the
size of Facebook.
A. Size of Equivalence Classes
In an interactive interface, equivalence classes may be
specified with conditionals using sql style interfaces or par-
ticular API calls. Examples evaluated in this section include
selecting those users in a particular city or users affiliated
with a particular network. The size of the equivalence class
is obviously a bound on what q values may be calculated
for its data. The distribution of city locations and network
affiliations in the test data is shown in Figure 5. A few
locations and affiliations dominate the distribution with nearly
half of the users sharing either a location or network affiliation,
a few other values account for 5-10% of all values. Within a
social application such a distribution should not be surprising
considering that proximity and affiliation are the basis for
many social connections. However, what can be noted is that
about 20-40% of all values considered specify equivalence
classes containing about 1% of the overall users. These
smaller equivalence classes consist of only 5-10 users and may
not be able to support PP-anonymous queries with q values
greater than 3 or 4. As such, a PP-anonymous interface with
q ≥ 10 would not release information to queries specifying
these smaller equivalence classes.
B. Distribution of Attribute Values
However, a large equivalence does not itself guarantee any
anonymity as it may not contain significant overlap in the
attributes for which the query is interested. For instance, the
music and movie preferences listed by the users in the test
data contain significant diversity as seen in Figure 4. While
many of the users may indeed list the same movies and music
artists among their favorite they often will not use matching
strings to refer to same artist or movie. For instance users
may list ”Lord of the Rings”, ”LOTR”, ”The Rings Trilogy”,
or even ”I heart LOTR”. This reduces the usefulness of the
data and disallows release of over 95% of music and movie
data values under PP-anonymity with q ≥ 10. Facebook is
currently moving toward standardizing these values (probably
to increase their worth to Facebook) through a new feature
called connections in which the user ”likes” something (e.g.,
thumbs up, thumbs down) resulting in a canonical string for
each artist or movie. To understand how this data might be
distributed the movie values from the data set were partially
sanitized by using google.com to search imdb.com for the un-
sanitized string value and then replacing the value with the
movie title of the first result. This approach found the correct
movie for over 95% of the movie values. When sanitized, over
four times as many movie values were able to be released
under PP-anonymity with a q = 10 and the same amount of
data released from the un-sanitized movie values with q = 10
could now be released with q = 27, significantly increasing
anonymity and the utility of the data. Considering that these
values of q were calculated over a small subset of Facebook
data (less than .001% of Facebook users) it is possible that
much larger values of q could be calculated considering only
1% of Facebook users. Furthermore, since q generally grows
with the number of users being evaluated, the number of users
which need to be evaluated could be bounded given a target
q values.
C. Scalability
Even if the number of users to be evaluated is bounded,
would it be practical to calculate q over, say, a million users
for every API call? A previous work which considered the
feasibility of using logic minimization on social network data
in the manner considered in this paper found that using Quine-
McCluskey, an algorithm from the 1950’s, the simple two level
boolean expressions created from social network users and
their data can be minimized in milliseconds for hundreds of
users [18]. Furthermore, such minimization generally scales
linearly for the Facebook data that was tested in that paper.
The authors of this paper are currently working to use more
advanced minimization techniques designed to scale linearly
for simple two-level minimization problems like that involved
in calculating q.
D. Current Work
A minimization method developed at Czech Technical
University has been shown to scale linearly for two-level
logic minimization problems in which there are many terms
(millions) and far fewer literals[19]. This algorithm is being
evaluated for use in calculating q due to the fact that when
there are n users (literals) and m attribute values, the number
of terms to be minimzed is bounded by O(nn4 ) whenm ≥ √n,
otherwise when m <
√
n the number of terms is bounded
by O(( nm )
m). While the number of terms has never been
observed to scale anywhere near the maximum bound, it has
been observed that as q increases so too does the ratio between
terms to be simplified and the number of users (literals) in
those terms. Whether or not q can be calculated for millions
of users is still not known due to lack of access to a sufficiently
large legitimate data set. However, q can be calculated over
hundreds of users producing q ≤ 50.
IX. CONCLUSION & SUMMARY
The question of what constitutes weak or strong anonymity
is still unanswered. To a large extent appropriate values for
q will depend on the particular context and how the data
being released relates to that context. In this sense, this paper
does not claim that PP-anonymity can measure whether or
not something is sufficiently anonymous. However, if practical
values of q can be identified then those values could be used
as the basis for policies governing use of social network APIs.
For instance, API sessions could limit the number of queries
within a certain amount of time or the API registration process
could use q to limit or specify how, when and who will use the
data. In short, having some way to measure the anonymity of
a social network’s API provides a tool with which to quantify
and incorporate anonymity into social network data policies
and practices.
This paper has shown that existing anonymity measures
cannot be applied to social network APIs, the most common
form of private data release on the internet. An alternative
anonymity definition was proposed (PP-anonymity) which
assumes an interactive interface model like that used by
social network APIs. PP-anonymity measures the posterior
probability that an all-knowing attacker may use an API query
response to deduce which data maps to which user. Finally,
real Facebook data was analyzed to understand what levels are
PP-anonymity are practical for social network applications.
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